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ALTERNATIVES TO LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
DAVID S. LAW* 
ABSTRACT 
 The global appeal of liberal constitutional democracy—defined 
as a competitive multiparty system combined with governance 
within constitutional limits—cannot be taken for granted due to the 
existence of competing forms of government that appear successful 
along a number of practical dimensions and consequently enjoy 
high levels of public acceptance.  Proponents of liberal constitu-
tional democracy must be prepared to proactively explain and de-
fend its capacity to satisfy first-order political needs.  A system of 
government is unlikely to command popular acceptance unless it 
can plausibly claim to address the problems of oppression, tribal-
ism, and physical and economic security. 
 Along these dimensions, the advantages of liberal constitutional 
democracy over the alternatives of social democracy of the type 
seen in Scandinavia, and bureaucratic authoritarianism of the type 
seen in parts of Asia, are not self-evident.  Within Asia alone, seem-
ingly functional alternatives to liberal constitutional democracy 
run the gamut from illiberal nondemocracy in China, to liberal 
one-party rule in Japan, to illiberal constitutional democracy in 
Singapore, to liberal constitutional nondemocracy in Hong Kong, 
to hereditary monarchy in Bhutan. 
This is obviously a moment of both crisis and opportunity for the enter-
prise of comparative constitutional law.  On the one hand, the feeling of 
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global constitutional interdependency has never been stronger.  Even casual 
observers are watching events in the United Kingdom, United States, and 
France for hints of whatever combination of Zeitgeist and Russian sabotage 
might tip the balance against NATO or the European Union.1  It is hard to 
shake the feeling that a domino effect is at work.  On the other hand, com-
parative constitutional law has always been a cosmopolitan project, and it 
does not feel very fashionable right now to be cosmopolitan.  Descriptive 
arguments about the globalization of constitutional law run the risk of being 
disproven, while normative arguments about the desirability of such globali-
zation are out of vogue in the political arena.2  At a time when even the State 
Department finds itself under a form of house arrest,3 how can legal academia 
possibly press forward with a global agenda?  Of course, it is precisely be-
cause the current environment is inhospitable to global engagement that 
global engagement is more imperative than ever.  Nature abhors a vacuum, 
and if we do not fill it, someone else will. 
The appeal and superiority of constitutional democracy (defined here as 
governance pursuant to competitive multiparty elections and within constitu-
tional limits) cannot be taken for granted.  Reflexive allegiance to constitu-
tional democracy has not been the case in Latin America (with its history of 
squishy popular support for democracy as opposed to strongman rule),4 and 
it certainly cannot be assumed in Asia, where—as discussed at length in Part 
                                                          
 1.  See Aurelien Breeden et al., Macron Campaign Says It Was Target of ‘Massive’ Hacking 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/europe/france-
macron-hacking.html. 
 2.  See Mattias Kumm et al., The End of ‘the West’ and the Future of Global Constitutional-
ism, in 6 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 1, 3, 5 (2017) (noting the rise to power of “populist nation-
alist authoritarian movements” in various countries, including the United States, that count among 
their tenets the view that “inauthentic elites need to be prevented from following through on their 
basically treasonous globalist ideologies,” but ultimately taking the view that the “darkest pessi-
mism” about the fate of “Global Constitutionalism” “is the result of a Western bias”). 
 3.  See, e.g., P.J. Crowley, Rex Tillerson, America’s Low-Energy Top Diplomat, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/opinion/rex-tillerson-americas-low-energy-
top-diplomat.html; Nicole Gaouette, State Department Silent While Other Countries Shape the Mes-
sage, CNN (Feb. 21, 2017), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/21/politics/state-department-tillerson-
press-silence; Gardiner Harris, Where Is Rex Tillerson? Top Envoy Keeps Head Down and Travels 
Light, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/world/europe/germany-
rex-tillerson.html; Julia Ioffe, The State of Trump’s State Department, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2017),  
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/state-department-trump/517965 (not-
ing, inter alia, the lack of State Department participation in recent meetings with heads of state and 
the cancellation, for several months, of the State Department’s once-daily press briefings). 
 4.  See, e.g., Rodolfo Sarsfield & Fabián Echegaray, Opening the Black Box: How Satisfaction 
with Democracy and Its Perceived Efficacy Affect Regime Preference in Latin America, 18 INT’L J. 
PUB. OPINION RES. 153, 156 fig.1 (2005) (reporting, inter alia, that only thirty-six percent of Latin 
American respondents described themselves as “very” or “fairly” satisfied with democracy, while 
only fifty-five percent expressed a preference for democracy over authoritarianism). 
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III—single-party regimes5 and even full-blown monarchy6 have proven ca-
pable of commanding healthy levels of public support.  This popular ac-
ceptance of nondemocratic regimes ought to give pause to proponents of con-
stitutional democracy, given that Asia is home to sixty percent of the world’s 
population and the primary engine of global economic growth.7 
Scholarly fixation upon the “usual suspects” in Western Europe and the 
English-speaking world8—at the expense of paying due attention to other re-
gions—carries considerable risks for the enterprise of comparative constitu-
tional law as well as for the health of constitutional democracy.  The conse-
quences of neglecting other parts of the world are potentially dire.  Doing so 
means not only that attractive competitors to constitutional democracy can 
sneak up on us, but also that we risk reverse contagion.  Sooner or later, if we 
do not challenge alternatives to constitutional democracy on their own turf—
if alternatives to constitutional democracy in Asia or elsewhere continue to 
flourish and gain credibility through association with rising prosperity—we 
can expect those alternatives to challenge us on our own turf.9  If waves of 
democratization can emanate outward from the world’s democracies,10 so too 
can waves of non-democracy wash back in our faces from the world’s non-
democracies. 
There are a few basic criteria against which systems of government are 
routinely, and reasonably, judged.  Oppression, tribalism, lack of physical 
security, and lack of economic security are central and recurring problems 
                                                          
 5.  Singapore and China are examples of single-party regimes that enjoy meaningful public 
support, as discussed below in Part III.   
 6.  In Bhutan, the transition from monarchy to “Democratic Constitutional Monarchy,” was 
forced by the King himself upon a highly skeptical, if not resistant, population. BHUTAN CONST. 
art. 1(2); see LYONPO SONAM TOBGYE, THE CONSTITUTION OF BHUTAN: PRINCIPLES AND 
PHILOSOPHIES 19–20 (2015) (describing the “surprise and disbelief” that met the 2001 royal “proc-
lamation that Bhutan would embrace democracy” and adopt a written constitution to that effect); 
see also Bhutan’s Mock Election: Voting for the Thunder Dragon, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2007, at 
50 [hereinafter Voting for the Thunder Dragon]. 
 7.  See Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Asia’s Resilience, 51 FIN. & DEV. 22, 23 (2014) (noting that Asia 
accounts for 44% of global economic growth, 20% of global demand, and 60% of world population). 
 8.  RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4, 39 (2014) (critiquing the tendency of the comparative constitutional law 
literature to focus on a handful of unrepresentative “usual suspect” jurisdictions). 
 9.  Granted, there are echoes here of the second Bush administration’s neocon justifications 
for meddling in the Middle East, but we are not talking about a massive commitment of national 
blood and treasure—just a reshaping of the scholarly agenda.  See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, 
DECISION POINTS 396 (2010) (“[T]ake the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us 
again here at home.”); Keir A. Lieber & Robert J. Lieber, The Bush National Security Strategy, 7 
U.S. FOREIGN POL’Y AGENDA 32, 32–33 (2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=3468 (noting 
that preemptive action against potential threats on foreign soil was a central tenet of the second Bush 
Administration’s national security strategy). 
 10.  See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 13–26, 290–93 (1991) (identifying three historical “waves of democratiza-
tion”). 
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for governments everywhere.  They are central in the sense that it is hard to 
justify any system of government that fails to address any of them head-on.  
If left unchecked, and especially if combined, they are enough to sink any 
regime.  To address these problems is to satisfy the first-order needs of the 
population and to stand an excellent chance of survival.  Conversely, a system 
of government that cannot lay serious claim to addressing any of these prob-
lems is probably going to look deficient and is unlikely to fare well in the 
global competition for hearts and minds. 
Democracy purports, at least, to directly address the problem of oppres-
sion (hence its enduring attraction and appeal).  If the people (or at least a 
majority of them) get to choose their own leaders and participate directly in 
government, they cannot easily argue that they are being oppressed.  But even 
democracy does not solve the problem of oppression entirely.  Mere democ-
racy, in the form of unchecked majority rule, leaves the door open to oppres-
sion of minorities.  It also might not do much to address the problems of 
tribalism and economic insecurity.  Especially if compounded by ignorance 
at the popular level (misinformation, propaganda, fake news, not to mention 
sheer lack of knowledge), these two problems can lead to short-sighted, self-
destructive, and/or deranged behavior at both the domestic and international 
levels.  Domestically, economic insecurity and tribalism can lead majorities 
to prey upon minorities; internationally, they can lead to predation in the form 
of war (see, e.g., Nazi Germany).  Ignorance, tribalism, and economic inse-
curity are collectively a recipe for popular and/or national sovereignty gone 
wild. 
Constitutional law and international law (of the post-WWII variety) are 
responses of a broadly similar variety to the problem of sovereignty gone 
wild.  Constitutional law is a response to popular democracy gone wild: its 
response is to limit the domain of popular sovereignty by making it hard or 
impossible for political majorities to do certain things.  International law is 
a response to national democracy gone wild: its response is to prohibit na-
tions from doing certain things, either to other nations or to their own sub-
jects.  The goal of both projects is what the Europeans call “constrained de-
mocracy.”11 
Both of these global “law as constraint on democracy” projects are sus-
ceptible to failure, to say the least.  Both require us to place our faith in elites 
and in law.  Their success rests on the ability of law-wielding elites to keep 
the pot from boiling over.  First, by definition, constitutional law and inter-
                                                          
 11.  See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 276 (2015) (citing Jan Werner-Müller, Beyond Militant Democracy?, 
73 NEW LEFT REV. 39, 44 (2012) and Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical 
Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766 (2001)). 
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national law are elite-driven projects.  These constraints can only be admin-
istered by elites who stand apart from the very forces they are supposed to 
constrain.  In the case of constitutional law, the elites are lawyers and judges 
flying the banners of constitutionalism, rule of law, human rights, and so 
forth; in the case of international law, the elites are still more lawyers, gov-
ernment officials, diplomats, and bureaucrats. 
Second, the success of both projects depends on the efficacy of law.  
This faith in law might not be justified.  It may well be that trying to prevent 
mass atrocity via law is the equivalent of trying to cut down a tree with a 
spoon.  Public lawyers and international lawyers are supposed to be the keep-
ers of the faith, and the primary article of that faith is that the tools of law are 
up to the task.  But lawyers, like others, are always at risk of succumbing to 
the law of the instrument: when you have a hammer, everything looks like a 
nail, and when you have a legal background, everything looks like a problem 
that can be solved with law, regardless of whether this is in fact the case. 
So, the case for constitutional democracy as an answer to the problem 
of democracy gone wild seems a bit shaky.  But what are the alternatives?  
Does constitutional democracy win by default?  What other ways are there to 
prevent some combination of ignorance, tribalism, and economic insecurity 
from causing the cauldron to boil over and deranging the state?  Let us survey 
three extant options that can at least claim to have solutions to some of these 
problems: liberal constitutional democracy, social democracy, and bureau-
cratic authoritarianism.  These three options range along a spectrum in terms 
of the degree to which they seek to limit popular democracy.  Liberal consti-
tutional democracy imposes an intermediate degree of constraint; social de-
mocracy views constraint on popular democracy as unnecessary and there-
fore imposes little constraint; and bureaucratic authoritarianism curtails 
popular democracy sharply.  Speaking in loose metaphorical terms, we might 
say that liberal constitutional democracy attempts to put a lid on the pot when 
it threatens to boil over; social democracy seeks to lower the temperature 
inside the pot; and bureaucratic authoritarianism aims to weld the pot shut. 
I.  LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
Liberal constitutional democracy has rote responses to some of these 
problems.  Its modus operandi is to heap restrictions on the state in order to 
maximize individual autonomy in the face of potentially hostile majorities.  
The rote solution of liberal democracy to the problem of minority oppression 
is constitutionalism (divide sovereignty among multiple actors so as to min-
imize the likelihood of dangerous concentration, plus guarantee constitu-
tional rights that place certain decisions beyond the reach of popular majori-
ties).  The same solution is supposed to work for the problem of tribalism as 
well: constitutionalism imposes limits on what any one tribe can do to the 
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others via the mechanism of the state, which in the liberal view is the only 
agglomeration of power that needs to be restrained.12 
A gap in the liberal state’s rights-based approach to the protection of 
minorities that has become increasingly evident as of late is that some of the 
least popular and most scapegoated members of society are excluded from 
the community of rights-holders in ways that can be highly arbitrary and have 
nothing to do with whether one belongs to an unpopular minority in need of 
protection.  Citizenship is a decisively important entitlement—it is nothing 
less than the “right to have rights”13—yet it is conferred or withheld for rea-
sons that are undertheorized, to put it charitably.14  So much depends on ac-
cident of birth, or holding the wrong type of visa, or being on one side of the 
airport rather than the other and thus being only physically, and not legally, 
on American soil.  Jus soli and jus sanguinis,15 blood and soil:16 this formula 
is tribalism in its primal form, and it lies at the beating heart of the concept 
of citizenship.17 
This is no coincidence.  Citizenship does not overcome tribalism but 
instead expresses and enshrines it; it is tribalism sanctioned by domestic and 
international law.  And it is sanctioned as part of a two-pronged strategy for 
managing tribal conflict: international law separates the tribes by assigning 
them to specific plots of soil and prohibiting them from intruding upon the 
plots that belong to other tribes.  But it is impossible to create a state for every 
                                                          
 12.  See Frank I. Michelman, Constitutions and the Public/Private Divide, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298, 305–06 (Michel Rosenfeld & András 
Sajó eds., 2012) (observing that the “proto-liberal” ideas behind the rise of constitutionalism in 
eighteenth-century Europe included the notion that there must exist “constitutional” laws expressly 
designed for the purpose of controlling the state’s unique powers).  
 13.  HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1994). 
 14.  See Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 1002, 1005 (observing that “[t]he vast majority of the 
world’s population acquires citizenship not on the basis of individual volition, choice, and consent,” 
as “liberal and democratic theory” would require, but rather “according to fortuitous circumstances 
that none of us control: where and to whom we are born”); id. at 1006, 1010 (describing the origins 
of jus soli citizenship in the feudal concept of “ligeance,” but noting that the jus soli principle nev-
ertheless looks affirmatively “democratic and inclusive” compared to the jus sanguinis principle, 
which has heavy “exclusionary overtones” and can lead to “perpetual intergenerational exclusion”).  
 15.  See id. at 1005 (noting that citizenship is conferred only by birth or naturalization, and that 
citizenship at birth “is governed in virtually all countries” by the two “dominant legal principles” of 
jus soli and jus sanguinis).  
 16.  BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND 
EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 27–31 (2007) (rooting the phenomena of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing in notions of group identity that revolve around a combination of blood ties and 
land use, and in a recurring preoccupation with “restoring purity and order” in “racial and geograph-
ical terms”); id. at 416–32 (discussing the central role that the concept of Blut und Boden played for 
the Nazis in defining German nationality and identity and justifying the mass extermination of those 
who lacked the requisite ties of blood and soil). 
 17.  Shachar, supra note 14, at 1005. 
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tribe.  There is simply not enough turf to go around, and barring ethnic cleans-
ing, tribes are inevitably intermingled.  Consequently, constitutional law is 
needed to complement the project of international law by limiting the ability 
of different tribes within the same territory to oppress each other.  Liberal 
constitutional democracy must rely on the post-Westphalian international le-
gal order to complete its work, and vice versa.18 
The rote solution of liberal democracy to the problem of ignorance is 
robust guarantees of freedom of expression and a free press, which enable 
the truth to emerge victorious in the marketplace of ideas.19  But even assum-
ing that the clash of opposing views does in fact advance the cause of truth—
which may be optimistic as an empirical matter20—it is worth asking what 
happens to Mill’s vaunted marketplace of ideas in the face of (a) rapidly fall-
ing barriers to entry, and (b) the existence of feedback loops between content 
consumers who prefer to hear certain things, and content producers who are 
economically incentivized to tell people what they want to hear.  Back when 
large-scale content distribution required a more meaningful investment than 
signing up for a Facebook or Twitter account, higher barriers to entry and 
production costs meant that communications media required a larger revenue 
base to sustain themselves, which discouraged them from appealing solely to 
very narrow audiences (except, perhaps, the most affluent audiences), de-
manded a level of scale and investment conducive to professionalization and 
quality control, and made fly-by-night misinformation campaigns less feasi-
ble.  By contrast, the inherent reliance of social media on preexisting social 
ties and membership in self-selected networks of affinity implies the tribali-
zation of information flows: as reliance on social media for news continues 
to grow,21 both content and distribution will increasingly track preexisting 
tribal divisions. 
                                                          
 18.  See David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153, 162 & 162 n.27 (2016) 
(characterizing the post-Westphalian international legal order as one that divides sovereignty among 
nation-states, but also conditions their sovereignty upon adherence to norms of a transnational or 
universal character). 
 19.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33–106 (James R Osgood & Co. 1871) (1859); see, e.g., 
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that a publisher 
“bids for the minds of men in the market place of ideas”).  
 20.  The view that truth and/or agreement will emerge through discussion and deliberation is a 
frequent assumption of democratic theorists but questionable as an empirical matter.  See, e.g., 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 174 (2003) (observing that “[d]elib-
eration, paradoxically, often drives [people] apart” due to the tendency of those in a group with the 
most extreme views to induce agreement); Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When 
Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 34 (2006) (report-
ing experimental evidence that deliberation can diminish a group’s problem-solving ability). 
 21.  Two-thirds of Facebook users rely on the site as a source of news, and nearly as high a 
proportion of Americans as a whole get news from social media.  See Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa 
Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (May 26, 2016), 
http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016. 
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Liberal democracy’s response to the problem of economic insecurity 
was never that satisfying to begin with, even at a purely theoretical level, and 
looks increasingly counterfactual when paired with a global trade and invest-
ment regime that shifts jobs and capital around the world for the benefit of 
roughly the same elites who seek to restrain national and popular sovereignty 
through law.22  The story of how liberal democracy fixes economic insecu-
rity, as best as I can identify it, leans on neoclassical economics and goes 
something like this: the economic dynamism that accompanies maximal free-
dom and minimal regulation or central planning is supposed to put resources 
to their highest and best use and grow the overall economic pie faster than a 
system that relies on central planning and/or extensive redistribution, and this 
growth will eventually benefit even the worst-off through some kind of 
trickle-down mechanism.  Recent history does not inspire confidence in this 
chain of assumptions.23  The problem of economic insecurity is the Achilles 
heel of liberal democracy. 
II.  SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
Social democracy: the siren song of Scandinavia.  The insanity of Nazi 
Germany—the very thing that the constitutional law/international law project 
is supposed to prevent from recurring—happened in their backyard.  But the 
Scandinavian response was not liberal constitutional democracy of the type 
described above.  The way to prevent democracy from boiling over, they de-
cided, is not to restrict popular sovereignty, but instead to invest in the people.  
Strike hard at economic insecurity, and the rest will follow.  The internal 
narrative went something like this: 
We could attempt to wall off certain choices from de-
mocracy using a combination of rights and courts and in-
stitutional design, like the Germans are doing.  Or, we 
could instead invest in the people, and in turn, the people 
won’t let us down.  Rather than trying to use law and courts 
and rights to hold a lid over the bubbling cauldron, we 
could try to keep the pot from boiling over in the first place. 
Rightly or wrongly, our confidence in our own people 
is not as shaken as it is over in Germany, because our his-
torical narrative is that fascism was of external origins.  So, 
                                                          
 22.  See, e.g., STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 123–28, 
131–35, 139–41 (2003) (characterizing “economic globalization” as a form of “oligopolistic neo-
liberalism” that privileges corporate capital, constrains democracy, and widens social and economic 
inequalities); DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 2–3 (1997) (arguing that 
“‘globalization’ is exposing a deep fault line between groups who have the skills and mobility to 
flourish in global markets and those who” do not). 
 23.  See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 544–96 (2014). 
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we have less reason to distrust either the people or the na-
tion-state, and less need to try to tie ourselves to the mast 
with judicial review and unamendable provisions and 
whatnot.24   
Maybe the way to attack the problem of democracy 
gone wild is to apply the principle of Garbage In, Garbage 
Out: a populace that is hungry, angry, and/or scared is 
probably not going to make the best decisions.  It is going 
to behave in deranged ways.  So let’s take the anxiety and 
fear out of everyday life.  Let’s socialize risk and go out of 
our way to provide for basic needs in a collective way.  We 
won’t be shy about income redistribution, which will sim-
ultaneously address both physical and economic insecu-
rity: the rich will have less to fear from the poor, and the 
poor will have less to covet from the rich.  In other words, 
let’s fight totalitarianism through social policy rather than 
individual rights. Everything will be fine if we care for, and 
trust, the people. 
Flash forward sixty-odd years, and Scandinavia looks pretty good.  It is 
boring, it is expensive, and it is homogenous.  The trains run on time (and 
have natural wood paneling to boot).  It may not be everyone’s cup of tea.  
But it certainly isn’t a failure.  At a minimum, Scandinavia’s track record 
proves that deep aversion to judicial limits on democratic processes is per-
fectly compatible with high levels of human welfare.25  One could argue that 
none of this generalizes very well beyond the setting of a sparsely populated 
and/or homogenous state.  Ultimately, however, doubts about the generaliza-
bility of this model rest largely on speculation.  And chances are that, given 
the choice, a lot of average folks would find this model very appealing. 
                                                          
 24.  See Johan Strang, The Scandinavian Value Nihilists: The Crisis of Democracy in the 1930s 
and 1940s, 19 NORDEUROPAFORUM 37, 39 (2009) (noting the post-WWII Nordic understanding 
of “democracy” as an “intrinsic part of Nordic cultural heritage” and “an integral part of the national 
culture,” and of totalitarianism as “intrinsically ‘foreign’”); id. at 62 (deeming it “striking that in 
Scandinavia, the rise of totalitarianism and the catastrophe of the Second World War did not lead 
to a rejection of positivistic thinking and relativistic moral theories”). 
 25.  See Ran Hirschl, The Nordic Counternarrative: Democracy, Human Development, and 
Judicial Review, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 452 (2011) (observing that “the traditional Nordic re-
sistance to judicial hyperactivism alongside the region’s exceptional record on both the democracy 
and human development fronts provide ample material to assess the perception of judicial review 
as a necessary supplement to democracy and its supposed contribution to human development and 
good governance”). 
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III.  BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM 
Some forms of government simply go out of fashion.  This can occur 
even if they have proven capable of addressing first-order needs in a satisfac-
tory way and there is no crisis or even criticism to speed their exit.  Tradi-
tional monarchy is an example.  In Bhutan, the century-long rule of the 
Wangchuck dynasty, which came to power via a written social contract with 
the people,26 was hardly a reign of terror.  But these days, it seems that even 
monarchs have doubts about the case for monarchy.  The irony of Bhutan’s 
transition to democracy is that it was the monarchy that made the case for 
constitutional democracy.27  And it was met with considerable skepticism and 
reluctance from a population that remains deeply attached to the monarchy, 
continues to place greater trust in the monarchy than in democratic institu-
tions and, in particular, views the monarchy as the far lesser of evils when 
compared to political parties.28 
This situation gave rise to the odd spectacle of two kings, père et fils, 
criss-crossing the country and, in one encounter after another, attempting to 
convince their subjects that hereditary absolute monarchy isn’t actually such 
a great idea after all,29 much as a slightly exasperated father might try to en-
courage his adult children to move out and get their own apartment.  Father 
and son made familiar and reasonable arguments of the type one would ex-
pect from a constitutional scholar.  They pointed out that, in a system of he-
reditary monarchy, all it takes is one bad roll of the genetic dice for things to 
go very bad in a way that is hard to correct.  They stressed the importance of 
checks and balances in case something were to go awry in the palace, and of 
giving the people institutional mechanisms for removing problematic offi-
cials, including the king himself. 
These arguments received grudging acceptance. Many remain skeptical; 
popular support for the monarchy remains strong.  As one local shopkeeper 
explained to me: “If you want anything good done for the country, the royals 
have to do it.”  Why so?  Because, in his view, elected politicians are either 
                                                          
 26.  See BHUTAN CONST. art. 2(3) (referencing “the inviolable and historic Gyenja” of 1907 as 
the instrument by which the Wangchuck family assumed the throne); LUNGTEN DUBGYUR, THE 
WHEEL OF LAWS, at v (2015) (likening the 1907 Gyenja that established the first king to a social 
contract); TOBGYE, supra note 6, at 12 (same). 
 27.  The new constitution does explicitly retain some monarchical character and assigns the 
King a number of meaningful powers, including command of the armed forces.  See, e.g., BHUTAN 
CONST. art. 1(2) (designating the state a “Democracy Constitutional Monarchy”); id. art. 28(1) 
(making the King the “Supreme Commander in Chief”). 
 28.  See Voting for the Thunder Dragon, supra note 6 (observing that King Wangchuck’s “im-
position of democracy” was, from the perspective of most Bhutanese, “unwelcome”). 
 29.  See TOBGYE, supra note 6, at 20, 44–46 (noting that the king’s announcement of a draft 
constitution that would democratize the country “took the people by surprise and disbelief,” and 
“that the fourth and fifth kings personally traveled the country in order to explain the draft consti-
tution to the public”). 
 2017]    ALTERNATIVES TO LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 233 
 
incapable of doing what the country needs or care primarily about their own 
interests and maintaining their own grip on power—as opposed to, say, a he-
reditary prince or princess who can take his or her authority for granted, is 
therefore free to act in the best interests of the nation, and has benefited from 
the very best global education that money can buy (education that is far be-
yond the means of nearly all Bhutanese). 
Bhutan may be atypical in many respects, but it does show that there are 
conditions under which reasonable people might choose autocracy over de-
mocracy. Even putting sentiment and tradition aside, it would by no means 
be irrational for calculating Bhutanese to retain the monarchy on the prag-
matic grounds that “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  Bhutan’s monarchs have 
by all accounts been competent, responsible, and well-liked.  To have such 
leaders in a developing country of less than one million people is no small 
feat.  The talent pool is simply not that deep.  Highly skilled human capital is 
a relatively scarce resource.  Running a full-on democracy requires human 
capital distributed among a relatively broad number of competing actors and 
institutions: it demands candidates for office, a multitude of legislators, and 
enough potential leaders with sufficient diversity of views to staff more than 
one party capable of assuming power, not to mention skilled administrators.  
In a country with only two-thirds the population of the Bronx and, until re-
cently, no law school,30 it cannot be taken for granted that there will be hun-
dreds of people with the skills to run the country.  A monarchical system that 
focuses on training a single family for public service is a plausible way of 
dealing with extreme scarcity of human capital.  Given the popularity and 
perhaps even functionality of monarchical rule in Bhutan, the best explana-
tion for its demise may simply be that this particular form of government has 
become too difficult to square with modern, global sensibilities. 
What has not gone out of fashion, however, is authoritarianism.  Some 
brands of authoritarianism feel sufficiently modern, and have proven suffi-
ciently successful, to suggest themselves as plausible alternatives to liberal 
constitutional democracy.  Authoritarian regimes can justify themselves in a 
variety of ways.  Ideology and cult of personality can play a part; so too can 
tradition and religion.  But they can also justify themselves in bureaucratic or 
technocratic terms.  One way to modernize and legitimate authoritarian or 
undemocratic rule is to pair it with bureaucracy that lends itself to techno-
cratic justification.  Substituting expertise for electoral accountability is a fa-
                                                          
 30.  See Kai Schultz, Centuries of Buddhist Tradition Make Room for Bhutan’s First Law 
School, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/asia/centuries-of-
buddhist-tradition-make-room-for-bhutans-first-law-school.html?ref=todayspaper (discussing 
preparations for the opening of the Jigme Singye Wangchuck School of Law in 2017). 
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miliar justificatory move in administrative law.  But there is no obvious rea-
son why this move cannot be employed more broadly to justify an entire re-
gime. 
The concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism helps to make sense of 
Singapore.  As scholars have noticed, Singapore poses a challenge to existing 
intellectual frameworks.  On the one hand, it is hard to assimilate into the 
framework of constitutional democracy.31  There is a lot of form without 
function.  The power of judicial review exists, but is not exercised in practice.  
Elections are held, but pursuant to rules that ensure the ruling party is never 
actually at risk of losing power.32  People can criticize the government, but 
face crippling (and legal) retaliation for doing so.33 
On the other hand, Singapore is difficult to dismiss or ignore because, 
along a number of dimensions that many people deem very important, it feels 
like a roaring success.  There are the sparkling shopping malls, the lush 
crime-free parks, the luxurious public “swimming pools” that resemble 
amusement parks.34  Imagine you are one of the eighty percent of Singapore-
ans who live in public housing (carefully planned and regulated, like every-
thing else in Singapore; each housing block is designed to have a mix of at 
least six ethnicities, and to avoid an excessive concentration of any particular 
religion).35  As part of their regular routine of housing upgrades for the sake 
of housing upgrades, the government replaces the existing, perfectly func-
tional garbage chute with one that looks nicer but proves not to form as air-
tight a seal as the old one.  You place a phone call to the town council, which 
not only fixes the problem by the end of the day but also leaves you several 
                                                          
 31.  Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception That Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: 
THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 73, 92–97 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir 
Moustafa eds., 2008); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 
448–54 (2015). 
 32.  See Tushnet, supra note 31, at 410–13. 
 33.  Libel and defamation suits brought by government officials against media outlets and in-
dividual critics are common and frequently successful.  Foreign newspapers can publish articles 
critical of the government, but by law, their circulation can be slashed to arbitrarily low numbers 
that drive them out of business or out of the market (as in fact happened, for example, to the Wall 
Street Journal).  See KEVIN Y.L. TAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN SINGAPORE §§ 519–21 (2011); 
Tushnet, supra note 31, at 406–07. 
 34.  See Sport Singapore, The Top 5 Public Swimming Pool for Families, ACTIVESG (Sept. 26, 
2016), https://www.myactivesg.com/read/2016/9/top-5-public-swimming-pool-for-families (de-
scribing, inter alia, the “undeniably impressive and extensive range of water park facilities” avail-
able at the public Jurong East Swimming Complex, including “intertwining spiral water slides, 
stretching from 22 to 155 metres and 5.5 to 17.7 metres” and an “energetic wave pool”). 
 35.  See Maisy Wong, Estimating the Distortionary Effects of Ethnic Quotas in Singapore Us-
ing Housing Transactions, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 131, 134–35 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpu-
beco.2014.04.006; Fareed Zakaria, What America Can Learn from Singapore About Racial Inte-
gration, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/from-singapore-
lessons-in-harmony-and-diversity/2015/06/25/86fcbfa2-1b72-11e5-93b7-
5eddc056ad8a_story.html. 
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voicemails apologizing for the previous choice of vendor and asking if the 
new garbage chute is to your liking.36  This is a system of government that 
takes constituent service to a whole new level.  It effectively substitutes cus-
tomer service for electoral competition.   
Needless to say, the trains in Singapore run on time (although, oddly, 
the buses do not). 
Singapore’s answer to the problem of popular sovereignty gone wild is 
paternalism writ large: the people are placed under the tutelage and mi-
cromanagement of technocrats groomed and promoted within a single-party 
regime that places a heavy premium on competence and rule-following.  Life 
in this authoritarian Disneyland—like life in the land of Volvo and Lego—
may not be for everyone, but the system itself cannot readily be described as 
a failure.  The typical cab driver is genuinely happy with life in Singapore 
and with the government, and it is hard to say that this satisfaction is merely 
the product of false consciousness.37  Certain freedoms are curtailed—cen-
sorship is routine; criticism of the government is fraught with peril38—but the 
large part of the population is satisfied with the tradeoff or simply does not 
care that much about the freedoms in question. For the average Singaporean, 
crushing defamation suits against government critics are a small price to pay 
for sparkling swimming pools and efficient, corruption-free public services.39  
This is not a place where most people say to themselves, “Boo hoo, if only 
we had a truly competitive multi-party democracy characterized by regular 
alternation in power and vigorous judicial enforcement of constitutional con-
straints, we could finally be satisfied.”  Instead, post-Trump, the idea of 
American democracy elicits a combination of disbelief, fear, and pity. 
The “Singapore Model” can of course be cabined, or distinguished, or 
depicted as ungeneralizable beyond its very particular circumstances (e.g., 
this over-the-top nanny-state approach only works for a high-density island 
city-state; it is more of a Mayor Bloomberg “soda is bad for you” municipal 
                                                          
 36.  An anecdote about everyday life in Singapore public housing relayed by a colleague. 
 37.  See Singapore Tops Asia in Safety, Quality of Living Survey, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (Feb. 
23, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-tops-asia-in-
safety-quality-of-living-survey-8176190. 
 38.  See Silverstein, supra note 31, at 86–92; Adrienne Stone et al., The Comparative Consti-
tutional Law of Freedom of Expression in Asia, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA 
227, 238 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) (observing that “no [ruling party] politician 
has ever lost a defamation suit” in Singapore, and that the damages awards in such suits are “crip-
pling”). 
 39.  See Nur Asyiqin Mohamad Salleh, Singapore Climbs to 7th on Global Least-Corrupt In-
dex, STRAITS TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017, 5:00AM), http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-
climbs-to-7th-on-global-least-corrupt-index. 
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government40 that has metastasized than an actual country).  But the argu-
ment that the viability and appeal of technocratic authoritarianism are limited 
to Singaporean soil only goes so far.  Singapore may be an extreme example 
of successful bureaucratic authoritarianism, but it is not the only example.  
The Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) has, as a practical matter, staked its 
legitimacy on delivering a rising standard of living, and it is not crazy for 
many Chinese citizens to support the regime for this reason.41  Plenty of 
Americans vote on the basis of pocketbook issues, and no one blames them 
for doing so.  The difference is that in the People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”), the elites of Zhongnanhai will not allow the people to act on their 
economic anxieties by electing new leadership—much less an orange-faced, 
hate-mongering demagogue who embodies the worst of democracy sim-
pliciter.  And liberal democracy’s massive, unforced errors as of late make it 
that much easier for the PRC regime to argue that the Chinese people are 
prevented from voting for their own good. 
Indeed, the more we look around Asia, the more we find that economic 
success and citizen satisfaction are not always so closely paired with consti-
tutional democracy, and that a number of the region’s success stories fall 
somewhere on the continuum of “more bureaucratic than democratic.”  Hong 
Kong, like Singapore, is difficult to square with the notion that constitutional 
democracy is the best or only way of satisfying first-order needs.  Like Sin-
gapore, it is a constitutional regime, in the sense that government behavior 
complies with legal limits.  But it is even less democratic than Singapore.  
There is not even a pretext that the executive or legislature is elected on the 
                                                          
 40.  See James Surowiecki, Downsizing Supersize, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2012, at 36 (dis-
cussing New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s effort to combat obesity by banning soft drinks 
larger than sixteen ounces). 
 41.  See, e.g., TERESA WRIGHT, ACCEPTING AUTHORITARIANISM: STATE-SOCIETY 
RELATIONS IN CHINA’S REFORM ERA 19 (2010) (observing that “popular support for the CCP-led 
political regime is strong, and public interest in liberal democratic change appears weak”); Bruce J. 
Dickson, No “Jasmine” for China, in THE CHINA READER 93, 97 (David Shambaugh ed., 6th ed. 
2016) (“To the extent that middle class Chinese are able to enjoy the perks of prosperity, they credit 
the CCP’s reform and opening policies. . . . The CCP is promoting the interests of Chinese in the 
middle class in order to maintain their support for, or at least acceptance of, the status quo.  So far, 
the strategy is working.”). 
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basis of a universal franchise: half of the legislature is reserved for “func-
tional constituencies” stacked in favor of Beijing,42 while widespread agita-
tion for an elected chief executive has made no headway whatsoever.43  Yet 
it is just as prosperous as Singapore,44 and significantly more liberal in terms 
of the freedoms that people enjoy.  Hong Kong is that rarest of rare birds: a 
liberal nondemocracy. 
The question one must confront in Hong Kong when it comes to the lack 
of democracy is: so what?  How does Hong Kong’s lack of democracy actu-
ally affect life for the worse?  It depends on who you are and whether you 
matter.  If you act and express yourself in inconsequential ways that Hong 
Kong’s pro-establishment elites can continue to ignore without risking any 
disruption to business as usual, then the authorities can pride themselves on 
their respect for your rights by leaving you alone.45 Thus, for example, if you 
are the type of law professor who simply writes law review articles (and has 
no administrative ambitions46), then you are probably safe because, as we all 
know, legal scholarship wields no actual influence over real events and is 
                                                          
 42.  See PO JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA 34–37 (2015); How 
Hong Kong’s Version of Democracy Works, ECONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.econo-
mist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economist-explains-1 (explaining how the “arrange-
ment of functional constituencies and their weighting against the other seats ensures that pro-Beijing 
parties have held a majority” every single time). 
 43.  See Michael C. Davis, The Basic Law, Universal Suffrage and the Rule of Law in Hong 
Kong, 38 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 294–96 (2015) (discussing the promise of univer-
sal suffrage in Hong Kong under the Basic Law and the subsequent moves by Beijing that have 
placed universal suffrage increasingly beyond reach). 
 44.  See Courtney Subramanian, Hong Kong Edges Out Singapore in Millionaire Wealth, TIME 
(June 24, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/06/24/hong-kong-edges-out-singapore-in-million-
aire-wealth. 
 45.  Whether routine and inconsequential expressions of dissent will continue to be ignored 
remains to be seen.  At Beijing’s insistence, Hong Kong authorities may yet be forced into the 
position of prosecuting wholly symbolic displays of dissent, such as booing of the national anthem 
by spectators at athletic events.  See Joanna Chiu, China Mulls Three Years’ Jail for Anthem Disre-
spect, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-disrespecting-national-
anthem-could-mean-three-years-072127979.html (noting that spectators at athletic events in Hong 
Kong have repeatedly booed and turned their backs on the PRC national anthem, and that the Na-
tional People’s Congress has responded by moving to make expressly applicable in Hong Kong a 
mainland Chinese law that would entail sentences of up to three years imprisonment for behavior 
deemed “disrespectful” toward the anthem). 
 46.  See Violet Law, Academic Freedom at Risk? Prof. Who Backed Hong Kong Protests De-
nied Post, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-hong-kong-aca-
demic-freedom-20150929-story.html (describing the decision by the governing council of the Uni-
versity of Hong Kong to reject the appointment of former law school dean Johannes Chan to the 
position of vice-provost as “a move widely seen as kowtowing to Beijing”); Shirley Zhao et al., 
University of Hong Kong’s Council Votes 12-8 to Reject Johannes Chan’s Appointment as Pro-
Vice-Chancellor, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-community/article/1862423/surprise-move-
chair-university-hong-kong (reporting that the purported reasons for rejecting the former law dean 
included his lack of a PhD and his supposed failure to “send regards” to a council member who 
allegedly suffered a minor injury during a student protest). 
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read only by other legal scholars.47  Indeed, even if I were to end this para-
graph with a call for Hong Kong independence for the specific purpose of 
tweaking hypersensitive Chinese officials, I would more likely end up under 
surveillance than under arrest.48 
By contrast, if the increasingly thin-skinned authorities under the in-
creasingly authoritarian Xi Jinping are concerned that you might wield actual 
influence, then expect the wheels of justice to grind you into fine dust, one 
way or the other.  Thus, for example, if you are the type of law professor who 
writes newspaper columns and instigates mass nonviolent protests that have 
an actual impact on commerce, then expect slow-burning, unyielding ire from 
Beijing and its proxies.49  Or, if you are a nonviolent student leader of the 
                                                          
 47.  We know this because Chief Justice Roberts has said so, and as all properly indoctrinated 
American lawyers know: judges have authority, higher-ranking judges have even more authority, 
and authority equals truth.  Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts’s observations must be true. Here, then, 
are his observations: 
  Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you 
know, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in Eighteenth Century 
Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote 
it, but isn’t of much help to the bar. . . . If the academy wants to deal with the legal issues 
at a particularly abstract and philosophical level, that’s great and that’s their business, but 
they shouldn’t expect that it would be of any particular help or even interest to the mem-
bers of the practicing bar or judges. 
A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, C-Span (June 25, 2001 at 30:45), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts. 
 48.  But in the event that I disappear from my office at the University of Hong Kong and turn 
up on Chinese national television to offer a confession or apology for my sins and transgressions, 
know ye now, for the record and beyond any doubt, that the confession will have been coerced.  See 
Michael Caster, The Last Missing Bookseller: One Year on, the Anniversary of Gui Minhai’s Ab-
duction Demands Action, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/10/17/the-last-missing-bookseller-one-year-on-the-anniver-
sary-of-gui-minhais-abduction-demands-action (describing the forced televised confession and con-
tinuing abduction of a Swedish citizen who sold books in Hong Kong laden with gossip about 
China’s rulers). 
 49.  More specifically, expect Beijing’s proxies in Hong Kong to stay their hand for several 
years until they have anointed an unpopular, highly pro-Beijing candidate for chief executive, then 
immediately bring charges the following day—presumably in the hope that at least some people 
will be too stupid to notice such blatant manipulation and will fault the outgoing chief executive 
rather than the incoming one.  See Benjamin Haas, Hong Kong Elections: Carrie Lam Voted Leader 
Amid Claims of China Meddling, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2017/mar/26/hong-kong-chooses-new-leader-amid-accusations-of-china-meddling 
(describing Beijing’s influence over the “heavily restricted election” that installed Carrie Lam as 
chief executive despite the fact that John Tsang led her in public opinion polls by a 26% margin); 
Jonathan Kaiman, One Day After Pro-Beijing Chief Executive Is Elected, Hong Kong Arrests 9 
Protest Leaders, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-hong-kong-
occupy-20170326-story.html (discussing the timing of the arrests); Catherine Lai, Hong Kong Um-
brella Movement Leader Benny Tai Says He May Plead Not Guilty to Public Nuisance Charges, 
HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/09/18/hong-kong-
umbrella-movement-leader-benny-tai-says-may-plead-not-guilty-public-nuisance-charges (de-
scribing the criminal charges against my colleague at HKU, Benny Tai). 
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pro-democracy movement who makes the cover of Time magazine and is ca-
pable of rallying people or serving as a beacon of hope,50 then expect to land 
in maximum-security prison51 through the unrelenting efforts of (1) prosecu-
tors who will appeal your initial sentence as too lenient (while indignantly 
denying any political motivation),52 and (2) judges who prattle on self-right-
eously about the “rule of law” (but with nary a word about how laws made 
by an unelected legislature and enforced by an unelected chief executive 
could possibly provide a basis for such sanctimony).53  Likewise, if you are 
an elected opposition legislator whose vote is needed in order to prevent the 
structurally guaranteed pro-Beijing majority from ramming through “na-
tional security” legislation54 (feel free to imagine what that might mean under 
                                                          
 50.  See Nash Jenkins, 8 Questions for Hong Kong Democracy Activist Joshua Wong, TIME 
(May 11, 2017), http://time.com/4776817/joshua-wong-hong-kong-democracy-teenager-super-
power. 
 51.  See Tom Phillips, Hong Kong Urged to Free Jailed Pro-Democracy Protesters in Open 
Letter, GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/18/hong-kong-
urged-free-jailed-pro-democracy-protesters-open-letter (discussing the Hong Kong government’s 
successful appeal of the sentence imposed on a non-violent, pro-democracy activist for “unlawful 
assembly” and the subsequent transfer of the twenty-year-old youth in question to a maximum-
security prison).  
 52.  Compare Venus Wu & James Pomfret, Critics Cry Foul as Joshua Wong and Other Young 
Hong Kong Democracy Leaders Get Jail, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-hongkong-politics-verdict/critics-cry-foul-as-joshua-wong-and-other-young-
hong-kong-democracy-leaders-get-jail-idUSKCN1AX0T3 (reporting that Hong Kong’s Secretary 
for Justice, Rimsky Yuen, overruled Hong Kong’s top prosecutors and ordered them to seek a 
harsher sentence for Joshua Wong, and quoting criticisms made by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and others of the government’s “relentless and vindictive pursuit of student leaders 
using vague charges”), and Catherine Lai, Hong Kong Justice Chief Defends Jailing of Democracy 
Activists; Slams Claims of Political Persecution, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/08/24/hong-kong-justice-chief-defends-jailing-democracy-ac-
tivists-slams-claims-political-persecution (highlighting Rimsky Yuen’s efforts to mischaracterize 
criticisms of his own motivations as attacks on judicial independence, and to confuse the question 
of whether the harsher sentence was legal with whether the decision to seek the harsher sentence 
was politically motivated), with Rimsky Yuen, Court of Appeal Decision: A Factual Account, 
STANDARD (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news.php?id=186647 (assert-
ing that “[p]olitical considerations do not come into play” in government prosecutions, insisting that 
“any suggestion of ulterior motive on the part of the prosecution is simply groundless,” and calling 
upon “the public and the international community . . . to . . . refrain from making baseless attacks 
against the government”). 
 53.  See Secretary for Justice v. Wong Chi Fung [2017] CAAR No.4 of 2016 (High Ct. Hong 
Kong Spec. Admin. Reg. Ct. App.); Chris Lau, Court Finally Releases English Version of Judgment 
That Jailed Hong Kong Activists Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Alex Chow, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/arti-
cle/2108919/court-finally-releases-english-version-judgment-jailed-hong. 
 54.  See Umbrellas Out, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 2016, at 28 (noting the reiteration by Hong 
Kong’s Chief Executive of the need for adoption of “national security” legislation to respond to the 
rise of pro-independence activism); David Tweed & Ting Shi, A Controversial Hong Kong Security 
Law Is Back on the Table, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2016-11-07/china-s-red-line-on-hong-kong-signals-increased-tensions-
ahead. 
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Chinese rule) or a curriculum aimed at “instilling patriotism and strengthen-
ing Chinese identity” among Hong Kong children55 (ditto), expect to be not 
only disqualified from office (say, for taking the oath of office too slowly, or 
with the wrong intonation56) but also forced into penury.57  And if some con-
stitutional law needs to be obliterated to make that happen, so be it.58 
                                                          
 55.  Peace Chiu, Is Chinese National Education Set to Make a Comeback in Hong Kong? It’s 
Not If, but How, Experts Say, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 4, 2017), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2105343/chinese-national-education-set-
make-comeback-hong-kong-its (discussing the proposed curriculum); see also Karen Cheung, Will 
Hongkongers Be Able to Move or Blink During China’s National Anthem? Lawmaker Urges Clarity 
on New Law, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/08/31/will-hongkongers-able-move-blink-chinas-national-an-
them-lawmaker-urges-clarity-new-law (noting that a new law that Beijing intends to make expressly 
applicable to Hong Kong includes criminal punishment for “those who insult the national anthem,” 
without clarifying whether behavior such as sneezing or blinking during the anthem might count as 
a criminal offense). 
 56.  See Elson Tong, 4 More Elected Pro-Democracy Lawmakers to Be Ousted Following 
Hong Kong Court Ruling, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/07/14/breaking-4-elected-pro-democracy-lawmakers-ousted-
following-hong-kong-court-ruling (describing the judicial disqualification of opposition lawmakers 
for such reasons as reading the oath of office too slowly, and speaking the word “country” in the 
oath with a “rising intonation”). 
 57.  See Amy Nip & Sum Lok-kei, Commission Is Likely to Sue Duo over Legco Cash, 
STANDARD (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news.php?id=187413 (report-
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ditional HK$95,180 each per month in salary, retroactive to the date that they took the oath as op-
posed to the subsequent date that they learned they were disqualified); Karen Cheung, Hong Kong 
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Dead End, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/08/25/hong-kong-legislature-seeks-hk1-8-million-disquali-
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tors owe a combined HK$12M in legal fees, in addition to the expenses and salary claimed by the 
legislature, and expect to go bankrupt). 
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that forced the disqualification of the elected opposition legislators, and observing that it had never 
before done so while judicial proceedings were already underway in Hong Kong); Cora Chan, The 
Legal Limits on Beijing’s Powers to Interpret Hong Kong’s Basic Law, HONG KONG FREE PRESS 
(Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/11/05/legal-limits-beijings-powers-interpret-
hong-kongs-basic-law (noting that China is bound by a treaty with the British “to respect Hong 
Kong’s autonomy until 2047,” and observing that the NPCS uses its power to interpret Hong Kong’s 
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In everyday life, however, there is little sense of government repression 
in the air, at least for now.59  On the contrary, Hong Kong is not merely lib-
eral, but laissez-faire.60  Unlike Singapore or mainland China, there are no 
great firewalls, and there is no government censorship of the press.  To turn 
on one’s television or to walk into a shopping mall is to be spoiled for choice: 
hundreds of channels, thousands of shops.  Better still, freedom and choice 
are matched by safety and security.  The homicide rates in Hong Kong are 
among the lowest in the world (except for that time they doubled, because of 
a boating accident that was classified as criminal negligence).61  What, then, 
is so talismanic about the combination of constitutionalism with democracy?  
Even if the laws lack democratic legitimacy, why is that troublesome for the 
average inhabitant as long as the reach of those laws remains within consti-
tutional limits?  Might it be that constitutionalism by itself, without democ-
racy, can successfully deliver what most people care most about? 
Japan—another success story—has long claimed bragging rights to be-
ing Asia’s oldest democracy, but a closer look suggests that its democratic 
credentials are also questionable.  Hiroshi Itoh calls it a “benign elite democ-
racy,” which might be closer to the mark but is arguably still on the generous 
side.62  The Japanese case is one of largely uninterrupted one-party rule for 
the last seventy-plus years.  As competitive multiparty democracy goes, Ja-
pan has been about as competitive as Mexico through the 1980s, which is to 
say, not very.63 
Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) is so entrenched that 
it has evolved mechanisms for controlling the bureaucracy that resemble 
                                                          
 59.  But see supra note 45 (noting the prospect that the PRC regime will insist upon the crimi-
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 62.  HIROSHI ITOH, THE SUPREME COURT AND BENIGN ELITE DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN (2010). 
 63.  See ETHAN SCHEINER, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT COMPETITION IN JAPAN: OPPOSITION 
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those of the CCP.  The Chinese government is characterized by the existence 
of two parallel power structures: one structure is the formal institutional 
framework established by the constitution, while the other is the CCP, which 
deliberately matches each formal institution with an equivalent in the party 
to better facilitate CCP oversight and control of all governmental decision-
making.64  For similar reasons, the internal organization of the LDP contains 
institutional counterparts to the bureau of the various government minis-
tries.65 
Nor do the echoes of bureaucratic authoritarianism end there.  Recall 
what we said about Singapore: “The power of judicial review exists, but is 
not exercised in practice.  Elections are held, but pursuant to rules that ensure 
the ruling party is never actually at risk of losing power.”66  Check, and check.  
Between the world-leading passivity of the Japanese Supreme Court and an 
unconstitutional electoral malapportionment scheme that has never been 
fixed,67 the same could be said of Japan.  It may not be an authoritarian state 
in the same mold as Singapore or China, but it is not exactly a thriving mul-
tiparty democracy either. 
In terms of trains, they run with such precision in Japan that in order to 
catch the one you want, you stand at the exact point painted on the platform 
where the doors for that specific train are supposed to open, and if the door 
does not open at exactly that point, you know it’s the wrong train.  This ena-
bles multiple railways to run multiple trains to multiple destinations from the 
same platform within minutes of each other.68 
So if we’re keeping score, we have so far managed to “limit” the situa-
tions in which bureaucratic single-party rule (with or without overtly author-
itarian tendencies) might prove appealing to: 
(a) small states, regardless of whether they are diverse (like Singapore) 
or homogenous (like Hong Kong); 
(b) large, diverse, developing states (like China); and 
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(c) large, homogenous, developed states (like Japan). 
With exceptions like these, what remains of any supposed “rule” about 
the limited appeal or viability of bureaucratic authoritarianism?  Why not 
“constrain” democracy all the way down to something approaching zero, if 
the people are happy with the results?  What exactly does competitive multi-
party democracy within constitutional limits offer that is better than what 
these regimes offer?  How compelling is the response that we constitutional 
lawyers have, as keepers of the faith in liberal constitutional democracy, to 
the argument that democracy is inherently vulnerable to some combination 
of ignorance, tribalism, and fear?  And if we cannot readily and convincingly 
explain what is so great about what we are peddling, what does that say about 
the long-term global viability of the elite-led project of constitutional law? 
Put to the test of popular acceptance—which is not a test that any polit-
ical system can afford to fail in the long run—it is not clear that liberal con-
stitutional democracy always comes out on top everywhere.  Given what we 
see in Europe, America, and Asia, is it really a foregone conclusion that the 
man in the street plumps for liberal constitutional democracy if allowed to 
choose?  Or that liberal constitutional democracy is the best option for ensur-
ing that the pot does not boil over again?  What ought to give us pause is how 
difficult it is for us, collectively, to explain—in terms compelling to average 
citizens—why this is the case. 
The answer, for many, may simply be to turn away from liberal consti-
tutional democracy.  No doubt many constitutional scholars might be entirely 
untroubled or even pleased by the alternative of social democracy.  It would 
be at least somewhat ironic, however, for constitutional scholars to advocate 
for a system that could effectively put them out of business.  As difficult as 
judicial review is to justify in a liberal constitutional democracy, the diffi-
culty of the task only increases under social democracy.  If the Scandinavian 
experience is any guide, social democracy would badly dent the importance 
and role of constitutional courts, lawyers, and scholars alike. 
Constitutional lawyers ought to find bureaucratic authoritarianism much 
harder to swallow, given its lack of democratic pedigree.  The problem is that 
a lot of people in many parts of the world are not nearly as troubled by the 
absence of democracy, and normative theory may not be the right tool for the 
job of convincing them that they ought to be more troubled than they actually 
are.  Normative theory probably works best on normative theorists; in this 
sense, it is most effective where it is least needed.  We can talk all we want 
about the moral or theoretical merits of democracy, but at the end of the day, 
there is no substitute for acceptance, and a big part of acceptance comes down 
to how people feel about their everyday lives.  Why should average citizens 
embrace theoretical arguments about the merits of democracy when bureau-
cratic authoritarianism seems to do a perfectly good job of satisfying first-
order needs on an everyday basis? 
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There are, of course, pragmatic arguments to be made on behalf of de-
mocracy.  Churchill famously defended democracy on consequentialist 
grounds as the lesser of evils: “democracy is the worst form of Government,” 
he wryly observed, “except all those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time.”69  For the millions of people who seem perfectly comfortable 
with bureaucratic authoritarianism, however, it is far from self-evident that 
Churchill was right. 
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